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ABSTRACT: This paper considers the structure of the ethical subject found in Fou-
cault’s late works on ethics, and gives an account of his two major ethical concepts: “care 
of the self” and “aesthetics of existence.” The “care of the self,” it is argued, gives Fou-
cault a way of conceptualising ethics which does not rely on juridical categories, and 
which does not conceive the ethical subject on the model of substance. The “care of the 
self” entails an understanding of the ethical subject as a process which is always in a 
relation, specifically in a relation to itself. Using his essay “What is an Author,” it is ar-
gued that the subject of the “aesthetics of existence,” like the author of a text, is under-
stood to be fully immanent to the “object” which it is usually considered to be opposed 
to and separated from. Rather than aiming at a true expression of an “authentic” inner 
substance, Foucault’s “aesthetics of existence” leads instead to practices of “creativity,” 
whose form cannot be given in advance.  
Keywords: Ethics; subjectivity; Care of the Self; Aesthetics of Existence; form-of-life 
The final phase of Foucault’s work, his so-called “ethical turn,” has proved to be some-
thing of an enigma for commentators and critics. Whilst this aspect of his work has been 
generally well-understood and appreciated inasmuch as it analyses individual ancient 
texts, there is far less agreement by scholars on broader questions pertaining to the na-
ture of the positive position being defended by Foucault.1 Given that Foucault is widely 
considered to have undermined many of the foundations of modern ethical thought, 
with him frequently being described as a kind of “moral anarchist” or even a “nihilist,”2 
                                                     
1 To give just a few examples: Levy argues that the position Foucault develops should be understood 
as a form of virtue ethics (Neil Levy, “Foucault as Virtue Ethicist”, Foucault Studies, vol. 1 (2004), 20-
31); Jay argues that Foucault is advocating a kind of elitist “dandyism” (Martin Jay, “The Morals of 
Genealogy: or, is there a Poststructuralist Ethics?”, The Cambridge Review (1989), 73); Gros argues that 
ideas like “technologies of the self” and “relation to self” are not Foucault’s own concepts, but are 
simply a “grid for reading historical phenomena” (cited in Sebastian Harrer, “The Theme of Subjec-
tivity in the Hermeneutics of the Subject”, Foucault Studies, vol. 2 (2005), 229); Franěk argues that this 
“turn to ethics” is Foucault’s response to the charge of nihilism, an attempt to vindicate the idea that 
he had always been a “parrhesiast” (Jakub Franěk, “Philosophical Parrhesia as Aesthetics of Exist-
ence”, Continental Philosophy Review, vol. 39 (2006), 127). 
2 Themes that dominate his early Anglo-American reception, for example, in Charles Taylor, “Fou-
cault on Freedom and Truth”, in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 152-184; Alisdair Macintyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: 
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it is not at all obvious how we are supposed to understand the ethical practices Foucault 
seems to be recommending, or the ethical principles of the “care of the self” and the 
“aesthetics of existence” that he appears to advocate. Whilst Foucault uses these con-
cepts very often in these texts, he rarely discusses these higher-order questions: for the 
most part, Foucault avoids foundational or meta-ethical issues, devoting the vast majori-
ty of his attention to the details of the actual ethical practices discussed in the texts he is 
reading. Whilst defenders of Foucault have been very good at showing how many of the 
standard criticisms of his position fall down because they illegitimately ascribe to him a 
view that he does not hold (most obviously, those that charge him with “relativism”), 
they have generally been less successful, in my view, at giving an account of the positive 
position that he does develop. When defences of Foucault are made, they often take the 
form of an apology for his work which acknowledges that his concepts are underdevel-
oped,3 or even argue that, despite all appearances to the contrary, Foucault is, in fact, 
proposing a normative ethical framework, one which needs to be elaborated by the crit-
ic.4 A more effective way to counter the criticisms constantly levelled at Foucault’s work, 
I would argue, is to give a more precise account of the philosophical basis of the claims 
that he is making. Scholars have made some progress in clarifying these issues,5 but, in 
my opinion, there is still much work to be done.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1990); Richard 
Wolin, “Foucault’s Aesthetic Decisionism”, Telos, vol. 67 (1986), 71-86. 
3 See, for example, Franěk, who argues that his theme of the aesthetics of existence is “not fully devel-
op[ed]”, but that “given the overall character of his work, we cannot expect Foucault to provide theo-
retical foundations for the ethical dimension of his critical work” (Franěk, “Philosophical Parrhesia as 
Aesthetics of Existence”, 130). Or Gutting, who argues that the argument Foucault is making “hardly 
requires philosophical assumptions about subjectivity”, because Foucault’s use of terms like “free-
dom” and “reflection” need not commit him to a “transcendentalist philosophy”, but “may be readily 
understood as referring to everyday features of human life (the metaphysical equivalent of Freud’s 
famous statement that sometimes a cigar is just a cigar)” (Gary Gutting, “Ethics”, in Leonard Lawlor 
and John Nayle (eds.), The Foucault Lexicon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 141). Paul 
Veyne gives a much more nuanced version of this position, arguing that Foucault’s strategy is that of 
a “warrior”; his suspicion of “truth” made it impossible for Foucault to defend a morality in the tradi-
tional, foundational sense, and so his strategy, according to Veyne, was to simply assert his own 
“preference”, and give the reader reasons to be suspicious of the preferences of his opponents: “Fou-
cault did not attack the choices of others, but the rationalisations they added to their choices […] Fou-
cault did not worry about justifying his convictions; it was enough for him to hold to them” (Paul 
Veyne, “The Final Foucault and his Ethics”, translated by Catherine Porter and Arnold Davidson, 
Critical Inquiry, vol. 20, no. 1 (1993), 6). 
4 An argument made in e.g. Martha Cooper and Carol Blair, “Foucault’s Ethics”, Qualitative Inquiry, 
vol. 8 (2002), 511-531. This trend, of imputing to Foucault positions that he never himself endorsed or 
invoked, can lead critics to very counter-intuitive theses: see, for example, Beaulieu’s argument that in 
this period, Foucault had realised that liberalism “is perhaps not so bad after all”, and that this period 
of his work can be characterised as a search for a “liberal utopia” (Alain Beaulieu, “Towards a Liberal 
Utopia: The Connection Between Foucault’s Reporting on the Iranian Revolution and the Ethical 
Turn”, Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 36, no. 7 (2010), 807 and 811). Equally counter-intuitive is 
Fillion’s claim that Foucault, in these texts, is proposing an essentially Hegelian project (Réal Fillion, 
“Freedom, Truth and Possibility in Foucault’s Ethics”, Foucault Studies, vol. 3 (2005), 50-64). 
5 The most useful works on this aspect of Foucault’s trajectory, all of which greatly helped me arrive 
at the position I defend here are: James Bernauer and Michael Mahon, “Michel Foucault’s Ethical Im-
Foucault Studies, No. 19, pp. 135-150. 
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This paper aims to contribute to this ongoing work by considering the structure 
of the “ethical subject” argued for in these late texts. I will argue that the subject, for 
Foucault, is not understood on the model of substance, but rather as a process, a process 
whereby the subject reflexively relates to itself. Rather than understanding the subject 
according to the traditional philosophical dualism which would oppose an abstract tran-
scendental “subject” to its concrete empirical life, in Foucault’s conception these two 
terms are fully immanent to one another. The “care of the self,” I will argue, is to be un-
derstood in this manner, whereby the two terms, “care” and “self” are not opposed, but 
must be thought together. As we will also see through an investigation into Foucault’s 
text on the notion of authorship, we see the same model in his concept of an “aesthetics 
of existence,” a model in which the artist and the artwork are not conceived as two sepa-
rate substances, but are held together on the same plane.  
Giorgio Agamben has argued extensively for a reading of Foucault that goes in 
this direction, and so we will rely extensively on his work in what follows.6 He has some 
useful comments which help get a sense of what is at stake in some of Foucault’s con-
cepts, and is especially helpful in bringing out the philosophical foundations of these 
opaque texts. But, perhaps even more importantly, Agamben also has a very good sense 
of the complexity of some of the philosophical strategies Foucault pursues. As is well-
known, Foucault opposes the modern, “juridical” conception of ethics. But what we find 
in Agamben is a real sense of how difficult it is to think outside of this conception; Fou-
cault’s genealogical sensibility gives him a sense of how deeply-rooted this schema is 
within contemporary thought, and thus of how difficult it is for us to imagine an ethical 
discourse which would take a different form. But, even more importantly, it allows him 
to see that it is not enough simply to criticise this conception for it to disappear. If, as 
Foucault suggests, the problem with modern ethics lies with the very concepts that it 
uses, then these problems will continue to re-emerge for as long as our frameworks still 
make use of them. It will not help to switch from a “deontological” to a “consequential-
ist” viewpoint if the problem is with the very concepts presupposed by both frame-
works. The task, then, is not to make targeted criticisms of specific forms of modern eth-
ics, but rather to create a new set of ethical concepts, ones which do not lead to the “court 
of insoluble aporias” that Agamben sees as the inevitable result of any modern ethical 
discourse.7 Foucault and Agamben’s ethical concepts, as we will see in the final section 
                                                                                                                                                                     
agination”, in Gary Gutting (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1994), 141-158; Arnold Davidson, “Ethics as Ascetics: Foucault, the History of Ethics, 
and Ancient Thought”, in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, 123-148; Lynne Huffer, “Self” in The 
Foucault Lexicon, 443-448. O’Leary’s book-length study was also helpful, even though I would dispute 
aspects of his reading (Timothy O’Leary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics (London: Continuum, 2002)). 
Also useful was Vintges excellent article, which gives a nuanced account of Foucault’s position, and 
makes a compelling case for its convergence with aspects of Beauvoir’s project (Karen Vintges, “Must 
we Burn Foucault?” Ethics as Art of Living: Simone de Beauvoir and Michel Foucault”, Continental 
Philosophy Review, vol. 34 (2001), 165-181). 
6 Snoek gives a good (albeit brief) preliminary account of Agamben’s usage and reading of Foucault, 
including aspects of the intersection we will deal with here (Anke Snoek, “Agamben’s Foucault: An 
Overview”, Foucault Studies, vol. 10 (2010), 44-67; the relevant section is on 55). 
7 Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, translated by Lorenzo Chiesa (California: Stanford 
University Press, 2011), 54. In this way, Agamben places Foucault within a philosophical lineage (of 
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of the essay, are specifically designed to oppose and combat the modern, juridical con-
cepts. The aim of such concepts as “aesthetics of existence” (Foucault) or “form-of-life” 
(Agamben) is not so much to criticise the predominant discourses as to render them “in-
operative” (a term Agamben frequently uses). These concepts, as we will see, aim to de-
limit a certain zone in which the traditional oppositions which govern modern ethical 
thought can no longer be applied. 
The first section of the essay will examine the reflexive, relational structure of the 
subject presented in these writings. We will do this, following Agamben, by first looking 
at Pierre Hadot’s criticism of Foucault, and then criticising this criticism through a read-
ing of Foucault’s essay “What is an Author.” In the second section, we will consider 
Foucault’s primary target, the juridical conception of ethics. A consideration of the posi-
tion Foucault pits himself against will allow us to deepen our understanding of the 
structure of the subject outlined in the first part, and will help us understand why ethics 
for Foucault can take the form of an aesthetics of existence. In the final section, we will 
consider Agamben’s concept of “form-of-life,” which will be understood as an extension 
and generalisation of the position developed by Foucault. Foucault’s reflections, I will 
suggest, give us a more helpful figure of a form-of-life than those provided by Agamben 
himself. 
 
The Author and the Work 
Pierre Hadot criticises Foucault’s late, “ethical” works in the following way: 
 
in this care of the self, in this working of the self on itself, in these practices of the self, I 
too recognise an essential aspect of the philosophical way of life. Philosophy is an art of 
living, a lifestyle which engages the entire existence. But I would not speak, like Foucault, 
of an ‘aesthetics of existence.’ According to Michel Foucault, the meaning of this expres-
sion is that our whole life is a work of art that we must achieve. But the term ‘aesthetics,’ 
for us moderns, has a meaning which is completely different from the sense that the 
word ‘beauty’ had for the ancients.8 
 
Hadot was very sympathetic to aspects of Foucault’s project. Like Foucault, his own 
reading of the ancients was not conceived just as a contribution to historical scholarship, 
but was “a tacit attempt to offer contemporary mankind a model of life.”9 He was con-
                                                                                                                                                                     
which he clearly also considers himself to be a part), passing through Nietzsche and Heidegger, 
which deeply criticises modern “humanism”, but which also recognises just how difficult it is to over-
come (as argued, for example, in Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism). In their more “pessimistic” mo-
ments, each of these thinkers will see ethics in the modern, foundational sense (represented, for ex-
ample, by Kant) as something irredeemable, something to be abandoned, rather than something to be 
“worked through” or “corrected”. It is also surely no coincidence that all of these thinkers turn to the 
ancient Greeks when it comes to an elucidation of their own positive projects, as different as they are 
from one another. The point is not to agree with the Greek conception, but rather to see that it is at 
least possible to construct an ethics that is not based on later concepts like “will” or “responsibility” 
that, according to these authors, are a large part of the problem. 
8 Pierre Hadot, cited in Giorgio Agamben, The Process of the Subject and The Problem of Subjectivity, 
seminar on Michel Foucault, delivered in Saas-Fe for the European Graduate School in Summer 2009. 
9 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life translated by Michael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 208. 
Foucault Studies, No. 19, pp. 135-150. 
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cerned, however, at what he saw as Foucault’s “aestheticisation” of life, which relied on 
what seemed to be anachronistic readings of certain Greek ideas. Foucault’s ethics, he 
feared, were simply “a new form of dandyism,”10 based on a notion of life as a work of 
art, understood in the modern, aesthetic sense of the term.11 
As he readily admits, Foucault was no classicist,12 so it is initially tempting to 
concede the point to Hadot’s specialist authority. However, it would be far too simple to 
say that Foucault simply “confuses” the ancient and modern perspectives, as if he was 
unaware of the differences. In fact, Foucault is very careful to emphasise how difficult it 
is for us to remove ourselves from our modern perspective, and to understand the Greek 
concepts in their own terms. In fact, he even specifically warns us against the reading 
pursued by Hadot: 
 
all these injunctions to exalt oneself, to devote oneself to oneself, to turn in on oneself, to 
offer service to oneself, sound to our ears rather like – what? Like a sort of challenge and 
defiance, a desire for radical ethical change, a sort of moral dandyism […] The immedi-
ate, initial connotations and overtones of all these expressions direct us away from think-




a further paradox is that this injunction to ‘take care of oneself’ is the basis for the consti-
tution of what have been without doubt the most austere, strict, and restrictive moralities 
known in the West.14 
 
It would be strange indeed to consider the remarkably severe ethical regimes that Fou-
cault studied as analogous to the form of hedonism we find in the modern figures of the 
“aesthete” or the “dandy.” Rather than “confusing” ancient and modern concepts, Fou-
cault is fully aware of how difficult it is for us to understand the Greek idea of the “care 
of the self” without reducing it to one of these more familiar modern figures. As he sug-
gests, it is those who immediately conflate these ethical concepts with a kind of radical 
aestheticism who prove themselves unable or unwilling to escape the influence of our 
modern way of thinking. 
                                                     
10 Pierre Hadot, cited in Davidson, “Ethics as Ascetics”, 132. 
11 This argument has been repeated by many other critics. See e.g. Andrew Thacker, “Foucault’s Aes-
thetics of Existence”, Radical Philosophy, vol. 63 (1993), 14, where he bluntly states that Foucault “con-
fuses a Greek and a post-Kantian sense of the term “aesthetic” The wider (and in my view also mis-
taken) argument that Foucault is ultimately promoting a Baudelairean dandyism can be found in 
much of the critical literature, including Brendan Boyle, “Foucault Among the Classicists, Again”, 
Foucault Studies, vol. 13 (2012), 148; Michael Ure, “Senecan Moods: Foucault and Nietzsche on the Art 
of the Self”, Foucault Studies, vol. 4 (2007), 22; O’Leary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics, 2. Vintges is one 
of the few commentators who argues specifically that Foucault rejects this Baudelairean dandyism 
(see “Must We Burn Foucault?”, 175; but cf. also Davidson, “Ethics as Ascetics”, 134). 
12 In Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, Volume 2, translated by Robert Hur-
ley (Michigan: Pantheon Books, 1985), 7n. 
13 Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981-1982, edited by 
Frédéric Gros, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2005), 12-13. 
14 Ibid. 
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But there is another, perhaps more fundamental way in which Hadot misrepre-
sents Foucault, and this concerns the concept of subjectivity. As Hadot notes, treating 
our life as a work of art amounts to suggesting that there is an object, our life, and that 
we should have the same relationship to it that an author or an artist has to their work. 
But, if this is the case, then a reading of Foucault ought also to take into account the 
changed status of the relationship between the artist and the work that Foucault propos-
es in his famous essay “What is an Author.”15 As we will see in a moment, taking into 
consideration the figure of the author as it is developed in this essay seriously compli-
cates the charge that, in his ethical writings, Foucault is promoting a kind of modernist 
aestheticism. 
Foucault’s strategy in this text is complex. Unlike certain others who proclaimed 
the “death of the author” in the same period, Foucault does not aim to erase the term 
completely. No longer understanding the author in the traditional sense as something 
transcendent to the work, in possession of the final, absolute meaning of the text, he will 
speak instead of an “author-function.” Rather than trying to analyse the concept of “au-
thor” as if it were a universal, ahistorical category, he studies the practices and discours-
es in which the term arises, and analyses the way in which the term functions in these 
discourses. Thus, rather than treating authors as flesh-and-blood individuals who also 
happen to write texts, and rather than treating the concept of “author” simply as an ex-
ample of a metaphysical concept to be deconstructed, he analyses the way the term “au-
thor” actually functions in different discursive situations. “Author” means something 
quite different in mathematical, poetic, or religious texts, and this is something we 
should pay attention to when analysing them. 
Where others had tried to provide a set of rigorous, conceptual arguments 
against the traditional conception of the author, Foucault followed a more empirical 
strategy. Rather than providing a wholly abstract conceptual critique of the traditional 
conception, Foucault points out that it simply no longer captures what goes on in some 
forms of contemporary writing. There is a real sense in which the works of someone like 
Samuel Beckett, quoted by Foucault in his opening paragraphs, resist these traditional 
forms of analysis. Consider, for example, the following passage, taken from Beckett’s 
late masterpiece Worstward Ho!: 
 
Worse less. By no stretch more. Worse for want of better less. Less best. No. Naught best. 
Best worse. No. Not best worse. Naught not best worse. Less best worse. No. Least. Least 
best worse. Least never to be naught. Never to naught be brought. Never by naught be 
nulled. Unnullable least. Say that best worse. With leastening words say least best worse. 
For want of worser worst. Unlessenable least best worse.16 
 
How is the critic to respond to this kind of writing? There is no Joycean wealth of liter-
ary illusions to be elucidated, no complex formal structure to be brought out, no secret 
                                                     
15 The importance of this essay for Foucault’s ethics is suggested in Agamben, The Process of the Sub-
ject, and in Ulrich Raulff, “An Interview with Giorgio Agamben”, German Law Journal, vol. 5, no. 5 
(2004), 613. 
16 Samuel Beckett, “Worstward Ho!”, in The Selected Works of Samuel Beckett, vol. 4 (New York: Grove 
Press, 2010), 479. 
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“intention” buried underneath the words. The “meaning” of the passage, its drive to-
wards the leastmost, minimal point (the “unnullable least”) is, in a sense, right at the 
surface of the text, and does not need to be explicated by the critic. We are dealing here 
with what Foucault calls “an interplay of signs arranged less according to its signified 
content than according to the very nature of the signifier,”17 where the interest of the text 
is found more in the means of expression itself (the proliferation of neologisms, para-
doxical formulations and so on) than in any conscious “aim” or “intention” guiding its 
production. Because the text concerns itself more with the signifying process itself than 
with any determinate signified content, any reference to the “intentions” of a transcend-
ent author-subject is not so much “wrong” as irrelevant, of no real value to our under-
standing or appreciation of the text.  
So, when Foucault says we should treat our life as a work of art, we should not 
understand him to be saying that “we” are something separate from and transcendent to 
this object “life” which we ought to use as the material for an aesthetic work of art. This 
would re-introduce exactly the kind of dualism Foucault tries to get away from in this 
essay. The distinction is not one of two different levels, a transcendent author-principle 
opposed to the substantial work of art which it produces, but one whereby the two 
things, the author and the work, remain strictly immanent to one another. Returning to 
the concept of “care of the self,” this means that we must understand the two principles 
– “care” and “self” – not as two independent substances interacting with one another, 
but rather as inherently interrelated concepts, which always operate on the same plane. 
As Foucault puts it very clearly in the course of one of his discussions of an ancient text: 
“you have to take care of yourself: it is you who takes care; and then you take care of 
something which is the same thing as yourself, [the same thing] as the subject who 
‘takes care.’”18 “Care of the self” is therefore to be understood in both possible senses, 
according to both the subjective and the objective genitive – the self is both that which 
does the caring, and the object of that same care.  
Agamben makes a useful analogy between this difficult conception of subjectivi-
ty and the linguistic form of the reflexive. Unable to take the position of the subject in a 
sentence (even though it designates the subject), the reflexive can only exist in the form 
of a relation. Referring to an archaic form of the reflexive discussed in the Compendium 
grammatices linguae hebraei, Agamben says that Spinoza “explains the meaning of the 
reflexive active verb as an expression of an immanent cause, that is, of an action in 
which agent and patient are one and the same person.”19 His example, “pasearse,” means 
literally “to walk-oneself,” or “to constitute oneself as walking,” a construction which 
functions without the subject-object relation (as he asks rhetorically: “who walks 
what?”). This concept of an “immanent cause” gives us another figure to understand 
                                                     
17 Michel Foucault, “What is an Author”, in José Harari (trans.), The Foucault Reader (London: Penguin, 
1991), 102. 
18 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 53. 
19 Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(New York: Zone Books, 1999), 234. 
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Foucault’s notion of the “care of the self,” in which agent and patient, subject and object, 
coincide absolutely.20 
 
A Non-Juridical Ethics 
Before elaborating further the form Foucault’s ethics will take, we will briefly discuss 
what it pits itself against, so that we are able to fully appreciate how far Foucault takes us 
from ethics in its canonical forms. Since Nietzsche, many thinkers have tried to re-
conceptualise ethics in such a way that it would not have to rely on transcendent, ahis-
torical categories now deemed suspicious. What marks Foucault’s conception out from 
the rest is the extent to which he thinks modern conceptualisations of ethics are still de-
termined by these categories, first among them the notion of law. Criticism of this ten-
dency is also one of the major themes of Agamben’s work, and so his position on this 
point is especially clear: 
 
one of the most common mistakes […] is the tacit confusion of ethical categories and ju-
ridical categories. […] Almost all the categories that we use in moral and religious 
judgements are in some way contaminated by law: guilt, responsibility, innocence, 
judgement, pardon.21 
 
Foucault is less polemical than Agamben about this point, but he does also make a point 
of criticising this trend, arguing that the connection between ethics and law is not a nec-
essary eternal truth, but is rather a localisable (and relatively recent) historical for-
mation: 
 
we should not be led astray by later historical processes of the progressive juridification 
of Western culture, which […] has led us to take law and the form of law as the general 
principle of every rule in the realm of human practice.22 
 
Foucault explicitly presents his own ethical concepts as a contrast to this juridical model: 
“can we say that the care of the self is now a sort of universal ethical law? You know me 
well enough to assume that I will immediately answer: no.”23 Treating Foucault’s ethics 
as if it were saying to us “you must take care of yourself” or “you must make your life 
into a beautiful work of art” therefore misses this important point, that Foucault is try-
ing to think an ethics which does not take the form of an imperative.  
                                                     
20 As O’Leary helpfully points out, the English phrase “care of the self” is actually somewhat mislead-
ing, seeming to indicate that there is there is a certain substance, “the self”, upon which one performs 
the operation of “care”. By contrast, the French souci de soi, as well as the Greek epimeleia heautou and 
the Latin cura sui do not have this substantializing implication, since they are precisely reflexive con-
structions. See O’Leary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics, 119-120. 
21 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, translated by Daniel Heller-
Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 2002), 18. See also: “there is no surer index of the irreparable ruina-
tion of any ethical experience than the confusion between ethical […] categories and juridical con-
cepts” (Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End: Notes on Politics translated by Vincenzo Binetti (Minne-
sota: Minnesota University Press, 2000), 130). 
22 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 112. 
23 Ibid. 
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Of course, Kant serves in some sense as the paradigm for the “legal” conception 
of ethics, and he gives it its fullest and most consistent articulation, but the decisive 
point here is that juridical concepts permeate almost all modern forms of ethics, even if 
they do not recognise it as such.24 We are used to opposing ethics such as Kant’s, which 
are explicitly based on the form of law, with doctrines such as utilitarianism, which con-
ceives of “the good” in a different way. As different as this position is from Kant’s, it 
nonetheless still has its foundation in juridical concepts. In utilitarianism, “the good” 
itself is not equated with law, as it is in Kant, but the relationship which the ethical subject 
has to this good is nevertheless still essentially one of law. The subject is faced with “the 
good,” which commands or compels it to act a certain way: even if all juridical notions 
are removed from the conception of the good itself (such as, for example, the utilitarian 
notion of happiness, which is not a juridical concept), they inevitably reappear when we 
ask about the mechanism by which this good affects subjects. A utilitarian is just as like-
ly as a Kantian to describe any given action as “permissible” or “impermissible,” accord-
ing to whether it conforms to a certain law (the law of utility), which dictates to us what 
we ought and ought not do. If we were to ask a utilitarian why an individual subject 
ought to follow the ethics they propose, they would not be able to avoid recourse to the 
paradigm of law in their response. Thus, even in other forms of modern ethics, the good 
is still conceived on the model of the law, as an imperative that it is our task or our duty 
to follow. 
We can thus see how misplaced is any criticism which reproaches Foucault for 
not providing an ethics in the normative, prescriptive sense:25 it is precisely this sense of 
ethics that Foucault is trying to overcome. The idea that this leads Foucault to a kind of 
relativism simply begs the question against him: the very idea of relativism still relies on 
the idea that morality is essentially about law. Supposing relativism to be the position 
that “there is no Law” still presupposes that ethical notions, if they were to exist, would 
have to take the form of law, subject to categories such as “validity,” “permissibility” and 
so on. Foucault is not saying that morality is “groundless,” only that the ground it does 
have is not absolute; as Paul Veyne puts it, his is a “morality with no claim to universali-
ty.”26  
Foucault’s notion of life as a work of art was his idea of something which might 
help us begin to escape this tendency: 
 
                                                     
24 Although I do not agree with his criticism of Foucault, for reasons already discussed, Michael Ure 
makes a good case that middle Nietzsche is an exception to modern philosophy’s general neglect of 
this way of thinking about ethics (Ure, “Senecan Moods”, 24-25). We might also wonder whether 
virtue ethics also constitutes an exception to this general tendency; in his reading of Foucault as a 
virtue ethicist, Levy makes the point that Anglo-American virtue ethicists have also specifically criti-
cised the tendency to base ethics on juridical categories (Levy, “Foucault as Virtue Ethicist”, 21). 
25 As argued most famously in Jürgen Habermas, “Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present: On Fou-
cault’s Lecture on Kant’s What is Enlightenment” in Shierry Weber Nicholson (trans.), Critique and Pow-
er: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1994), 149-154. 
26 Veyne, “The Final Foucault and his Ethics”, 2. 
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The idea of the bios as a material for an aesthetic piece of art is something that fascinates 
me. The idea also that ethics can be a very strong structure of existence, without any rela-
tion with the juridical per se.27 
 
Whereas, as we have seen, it is almost impossible to imagine an ethics which completely 
avoids the concept of law, our conception of aesthetics tends to be much more open. 
Very few people would subscribe to the idea that there are “absolute” aesthetic criteria 
independent of social norms, and yet denying this does not typically lead to a total sub-
jectivist relativism about works of art. This, I would suggest, is also due to the continu-
ing importance of Kant’s philosophy for modern thought. Whereas for him an ethical 
judgement deals with a universal law, an aesthetic judgement, whilst still carrying uni-
versal necessity (a judgement of taste demands universal assent), takes its universality 
from the structure of the aesthetic judgement itself, rather than from its object. Whilst in eth-
ics, any given object is “in itself” determined as good or bad, according to whether or 
not it can be willed as a universal law, in aesthetics it is the judgement, not the object, 
which has the “absolute” status. Kant thus allows us to avoid relativism, maintaining 
the idea that there is some necessity to aesthetic judgements, while still holding that 
there are no external “absolute” criteria which determine what makes an aesthetic object 
beautiful. 
We have seen, then, what Foucault pits himself against. But what form does his 
own position take? If he does not conceive it in legalistic terms on the model of the im-
perative, then what does Foucault actually mean when he speaks of “ethics?” His con-
ception, I would suggest, is surprisingly modest, and is nicely summed up by Davidson: 
ethics is that part of the self “that concerns the self’s relationship to itself.”28 Ethics refers 
simply to the reflexivity of the self, that part of the self which “folds” back on itself. 
Deleuze emphasises this aspect in his reading of Foucault: 
 
[force] is inseparable in itself from the power to affect other forces (spontaneity) and to be 
affected by others (receptivity). But what comes about as a result is a relation which force 
has with itself, a power to affect itself, an affect of the self on the self.29 
 
There is no fixed “content” or “essence” to the subject: as Deleuze writes, there is no 
“subject” in Foucault in the sense of a substantial “person or identity,” but only “’subjec-
tification’ as a process and ‘Self’ as a relation (a relation to oneself).”30 The subject just is 
this form of a circular relation to itself, the absolute immanence that we saw in the lin-
guistic structure of the reflexive. Foucault makes this point very clearly in a remark tak-
en from one of his dossiers: “the self with which one has the relationship is nothing other 
                                                     
27 Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: an Overview of Work in Progress”, in Paul Rabinow 
(ed.), and Robert Hurley, John Johnston, P. Aranov, D. McGrawth (trans.), Ethics: Essential Works of 
Foucault 1954-1984 (London: Penguin, 2000), 260. 
28 Davidson, “Ethics as Ascetics”, 126. 
29 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, translated by Séan Hand (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 
101. 
30 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, translated by Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1995), 92. 
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than the relationship itself […] it is in short the immanence, or better, the ontological ade-
quacy of the self to the relationship.”31  
This, then, is why there is no contradiction between Foucault’s ethics and his 
work on power. Real ethical practices are of course saturated with power relations; Fou-
cault freely admits that the practices of the self are not “something invented by the indi-
vidual himself,” but are “models that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggest-
ed, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and his social group.”32 But it is not 
true, either, that the subject is totally determined by external influences; not in the sense 
that there is always a point of absolute freedom hidden deep within us that cannot be 
completely subjected to power, but rather that the self, in addition to being influenced 
by outside forces, also affects itself. The manner in which this auto-affection is carried 
out might itself be completely determined by external powers, but this is not a problem 
for Foucault’s theory, because his conception of freedom does not make appeal to any-
thing supposed to be “outside” of those power relations. Of those forces which act on 
the self, some of them come from the self itself, and it is these forces which constitute its 
freedom. If we were to give a diagrammatic representation of all the forces which act on 
the self, “freedom” would designate that subset of those forces which emanate from the 
self itself, “folding” back on itself, constituting and re-forming the very thing which is 
doing the constituting.33 
At a crucial moment in On the Genealogy of Ethics, just after Foucault has been de-
scribing the general form of his ethics, Dreyfus and Rabinow perceptively note that, 
with all his talk of “freedom,” he is starting to sound surprisingly close to Sartre, and 
ask him how their ideas differ: 
 
I think that from the theoretical point of view, Sartre avoids the idea of the self as some-
thing that is given to us, but through the moral notion of authenticity, he turns back to 
the idea that we have to be ourselves – to be truly our true self. I think that the only ac-
ceptable consequence of what Sartre has said is to link his theoretical insight into the 
practice of creativity – and not that of authenticity.34 
 
As far apart as Foucault and Sartre undoubtedly are in many respects, there are also im-
portant similarities. Foucault concedes that, like him, Sartre does indeed think of ethics 
                                                     
31 Foucault cited in Frédéric Gros’s essay “Course Context” in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 533 (my 
italics). Taken from Foucault’s dossier “Culture of the Self”. 
32 See Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom” in Ethics: Es-
sential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, 291. 
33 Bernauer and Mahon make a good case that the “passion for freedom” found in this phase of Fou-
cault’s work “is not novel”, even if it does “speak with a new accent” (Bernauer and Mahon, “Michel 
Foucault’s Ethical Imagination”, 151). With the caveat that there are questions of compatibility be-
tween his earlier and later works, they argue that “freedom” has been a consistent theme for Foucault, 
and point to his very early introduction to Biswanger’s book, in which Foucault speaks of “radical 
liberty” as the human essence. We could also mention Foucault’s use of the idea of “absolute free-
dom” in History of Madness, a theme dealt with extensively in Leonard Lawlor’s essay “Violence and 
Animality: An Investigation of Absolute Freedom in Foucault’s History of Madness” (unpublished 
manuscript). 
34 Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics”, 262. 
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as something emanating from the self itself, as a creation of the self rather than as a sub-
stance which is already “given” in advance. As different as their respective conceptions 
of freedom are, they both conceive it in positive rather than negative terms as a function 
of the subject rather than as a lack of external impediments. However, from Foucault’s 
perspective, Sartre’s notion of authenticity looks like just another fixed category which 
only betrays his radical theory of freedom, re-substantialising his concept of the self.35 
This critique of the concept of authenticity has important consequences for the 
way in which Sartre and Foucault see the relationship between the artist and their work: 
 
in his analyses of Baudelaire, Flaubert, and so on, it is interesting to see that Sartre refers 
the work of creation to a certain relation to oneself – the author to himself – which has the 
form of authenticity or inauthenticity. I would like to say exactly the contrary; we should 
not have to refer the creative activity of somebody to the kind of relation he has to him-
self, but should relate the kind of relation one has to oneself to a creative activity.36 
 
Rather than speaking of authenticity and hence implicitly referring to an alleged “deep” 
substantial truth of the subject, Foucault will suggest that “the practice of creativity” is 
the only “acceptable consequence” of Sartre’s theses.37 Importantly, this practice works 
in both directions. The artist not only creates the work of art: much more important, 
perhaps, is the way in which also the work of art creates the artist.38 It is not the case, as in 
the traditional model, that the artist stands in an exterior relationship to the work, acting 
as the active element giving “form” to an essentially passive “matter” that will eventual-
ly become the finished work. If we are to think of the artist and the work as immanent to 
one another, as we suggested above, then we must also think the way in which the work 
can reciprocally affect the identity of the artist.39 Rather than starting with the idea of an 
“authentic” identity which is then more or less effectively expressed in a work, we 
should consider the way in which the process of working on the work can, in turn, have 
a significant effect on the one doing the work.40 
The important conclusions to draw from this inverted relationship whereby the 
work works on the artist just as much as the artist works on the work emerge when we 
                                                     
35 In “On the Genealogy of Ethics”, Foucault mentions what he calls the “Californian cult of the self”, 
and makes it very clear that this is not what he is advocating, precisely because it seems to be based 
on a search for a “true self”, which relies on a completely different model from his “care of the self” 
(Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics”, 271).  
36 Ibid., 262. 
37 Ibid.; Bernauer and Mahon also suggest that “in place of Sartre’s moral notion of authenticity, Fou-
cault proposes the practice of creativity” (“Michel Foucault’s Ethical Imagination”, 161). 
38 See Agamben, “Interview with Ulrich Raulff”, 615. 
39 Cf. e.g. Foucault’s comment that “an author transforms himself in the process of writing” cited in 
Vintges, “Must we Burn Foucault?”, 167; also his question of why should a painter paint “if he is not 
transformed by his painting”, cited in O’Leary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics, 3.  
40 In a very interesting essay, Vintges argues that a very similar critique of Sartre had in fact already 
been made by Beauvoir, and makes a convincing case for a convergence between the Foucaultian 
position we have been examining and the “art de vivre” already proposed by Beauvoir. While showing 
some appreciation for Foucault’s position, she also makes a compelling case that it nonetheless re-
mains too centred on the self, and suggests that in fact, Beauvoir has a richer account of the self’s rela-
tion to others. 
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formulate this in terms of Foucault’s “aesthetics of existence.” In aesthetics, as we have 
seen, treating the self as an activity rather than as a substance allows us to think this re-
lationship in an immanent way. But aesthetics is, after all, only one kind of praxis, one 
extremely limited field within the whole range of possible human activity. In Foucault’s 
“aesthetics of existence,” however, the object on which the artist works is life itself, and 
so the two concepts, life and artistic activity, coincide absolutely. The two things, artist and 
artwork, cannot be taken apart: if the artist were separated from his work, he would lose 
his very identity as an artist. If the work were considered apart from its creation by the 
artist, it would become an inert object, reduced to its bare material existence, losing its 
status as artwork. If the “work” is nothing other than the artist’s “life,” then there is 




This is indeed the idea behind one of Agamben’s most interesting concepts, “form-of-
life,” which he defines as “a life which cannot be separated from its form,” or as “a life 
for which what is at stake in its way of living is living itself.”41 A person’s social role, for 
example, whilst a central aspect of their identity, is not a form-of-life: someone might 
identify themself with their social role, say, as a doctor, but if we considered their life 
apart from this form, we would still be left with a full, rich individual subjectivity. An 
aspect of their life may take the form of “doctor,” but this form does not at all exhaust 
the content of what they “are.” In a form-of-life, by contrast, the life cannot be conceived 
apart from the form it takes. Agamben’s clearest example is of the Flamen Diale, a priest 
in classical Rome: 
 
his life is remarkable in that it is at every moment indistinguishable from the cultic func-
tions that [he] fulfils […] Accordingly, there is no gesture or detail of his life, the way he 
dresses or walks, that does not have a precise meaning and is not caught in a series of 
functions and meticulously studied effects. As proof of this “assiduity,” the Flamen is not 
allowed to take his emblems off completely even during sleep; […] in his clothes there 
can be neither knots nor closed rings, and he cannot swear oaths.42 
 
In the case of the Flamen, it is impossible to separate the functions he is supposed to fulfil 
from the real life of the individual: the form “Flamen” constitutes the entirety of the life 
of this individual. Compare this with the case of the doctor: in this case, there can be a 
well-defined distinction between experiences that belong to the person qua doctor, and 
those that do not, those that belong to their life considered under some other aspect. By 
contrast, in the case of the Flamen, there is no event which could take place in their em-
pirical life that does not directly concern their role as Flamen, since there is a total coinci-
dence between the form that this life takes and the concrete life itself. Even minor or ac-
                                                     
41 Agamben, Means Without End, 4. See also David Kishik, The Power of Life: Agamben and the Coming 
Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 4. 
42 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 183. 
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cidental occurrences have significance at the level of form for the Flamen, to be subject to 
close interpretation. 
Agamben also gives the example of the Führer in the Third Reich.43 Unlike the 
traditional model of the leader, who functions as an individual instantiation of the gen-
eral form taken by their office, in the case of the Führer, there was no such separation. 
Whereas Barack Obama is an individual living being who subsumes part of his life un-
der the form “president,” in the Third Reich, the two things, the individual “Hitler” and 
the office “Führer” could not be separated, just as in the case of the Flamen. Although 
Obama, as president, also has the power to change the law, this issues from his office, 
not from his individual person (which is why he can be criticised for not fulfilling the 
proper role of “president,” which always exceeds whichever individual being occupies 
it). In the case of Hitler, his word immediately was the law, since he was supposed not to 
“represent” the will of the German people but to directly “embody” it. The form taken 
by his life – “Führer” – could not be separated from the individual living being who 
“was” that form – “Hitler.” Agamben provides a host of further examples in this chap-
ter, including the Muselmann, the homo sacer, Wilson (the biochemist who, on discover-
ing he had leukaemia, performed dangerous experiments on his own body), and Karen 
Quinlan (who was comatose, kept alive only by a life-support machine). What is so puz-
zling about this remarkable list of lives is that they are all ultra-extreme negative exam-
ples of what Agamben ultimately intends to be a positive, liberating concept. These ex-
amples are not helpful exemplars or positive models of ethical life, which make them 
extremely unhelpful from the point of view of the positive political project Agamben is 
trying to pursue.44 
But, we could ask, is someone who practices Foucault’s aesthetics of existence not 
also constructing a form-of-life, but this time in a positive sense? If the artist takes their 
whole life as their work, as we have seen, the two can no longer be separated. Just as 
every empirical event in the life of the Flamen had significance at the level of its ritual 
form, so does everything that happens within the life of the artist have an effect on the 
work of art that it has become inseparable from. The reverse also holds: not only do 
events which take place within the life constitute the work of art it has become, but the 
form that the artist gives to this work will in turn affect the way in which the life itself 
plays out. Just as the ritual and cultic functions that constitute the office of the Flamen 
determine the actual life of the priest, the aesthetic ideas and principles adopted by the 
artist will themselves “produce” the life that they are. Returning to Agamben’s formula-
tion, in this case what is at stake in the way of living (the artistic ideas according to 
                                                     
43 Ibid., 184. 
44 Agamben has, indeed, been criticised for this. See e.g. Lorenzo Chiesa, “Giorio Agamben’s Francis-
can Ontology”, Cosmos and History, vol. 5, no. 1 (2009), 108-111; and Boštjan Nedoh, “Kafka’s Land 
Surveyor K.: Agamben’s anti-Muselmann”, Angelaki, vol. 16, no. 3 (2011), 149-161. In his more recent 
work, there is perhaps more of an attempt to provide a positive figure for this concept. See e.g. Gior-
gio Agamben, The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life, translated by Adam Kotsko (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2013), although even in this work he is ultimately critical of the Fran-
ciscan experiment. This will perhaps be remedied in the last volume of Homo Sacer, which “will not be 
dedicated to a historical discussion”, but will deal with the concept of form-of-life in the context of the 
concept of “use” (see “Interview with Giorgio Agamben”, 612-613). 
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which the artist lives their life) is nothing less than living itself (that is to say, the artist’s 
concrete existence).45 
Could we not also say that Hadot’s notion of “philosophy as a way of life” aims 
at something similar? The figure of Socrates, I would suggest, provides one of the most 
original exemplars of the idea of a form-of-life.46 The name “Socrates” does not only des-
ignate a particular set of philosophical arguments: more than that, it also designates a 
particular way of living, one which, in his case, totally coincides with this set of philo-
sophical ideas. We cannot separate out what we know of his life into its “philosophical” 
and its “non-philosophical” components, where “Socrates-the-individual” could be op-
posed to “Socrates-the-philosopher.” Again, like the Flamen Diale, his every action has 
been subject to intense scrutiny and constant interpretation and examination, as centu-
ries of studies demonstrate. But this is not the same kind of scrutiny we find in just any 
figure whose biography is of interest: what sets Socrates apart in this respect was pre-
cisely this relationship he had with his own life. He was not an “archetype,” an “exam-
ple” or a “symbol” of the philosophical form of life, he directly was it. We do not com-
pare his life with an ideal form “the philosophical way of life” in order to see if the two 
match up, rather, the form directly coincides with this particular life, such that study of 
his life is always at the same time a study of the abstract idea.47  
In contrast to the “bad” examples provided by Agamben, these figures provide 
us with much more positive models of a form-of-life. The result of this total formal de-
termination of the life of the Flamen was, as we have seen, a thoroughly “repressive” set 
of rules that massively limited what he was able to do, to the point of an almost com-
plete suppression of any “freedom” he might have had. By contrast, an intense scrutiny 
of the formal details of the life of Socrates does not have a restrictive function, but rather 
works towards the creation of something new. What results from considering his life in 
this way is not yet another rule for him to follow, which would have the effect of limit-
ing his capacities, but rather the production of a work, a study which gives us some in-
sight into the philosophical way of life. Similarly in the case of the artist, the result of 
                                                     
45 Foucault’s best example of this, in my opinion, comes from an interview conducted very near the 
end of his life, on the occasion of an English translation of his early book on Raymond Roussel. Re-
sponding to a question about the relationship between an author’s sexual life and their work, he says 
the following: “someone who is a writer is not simply doing his work in his books, in what he pub-
lishes, […] his major work is, in the end, himself in the process of writing his books. The private life of 
an individual, his sexual preference, and his work are interrelated not because his work translates his 
sexual life, but because the work includes the whole life as well as the text. The work is more than the 
work: the subject who is writing is part of the work” (Michel Foucault, “An Interview with Michel 
Foucault by Charles Ruas” in Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel, (London: Contin-
uum, 2004), 186). In this remarkable passage we can see Foucault bringing these two concepts – the 
work, and the life of the artist – into such close proximity that they become almost impossible to dis-
tinguish (“his major work is, in the end, himself”; “the work includes the whole life”). 
46 See in particular Hadot’s essay on the figure of Socrates in Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 147-
178. 
47 We could say that Socrates is a “paradigm” for the philosophical way of life, in the sense in which 
Agamben understands the term. See Giorgio Agamben, “What is a Paradigm”, in Luca D’Isanto and 
Kevin Attell (trans.), The Signature of All Things: On Method (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 
9-32. 
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considering their life in this way is not to impose arbitrary rules on their behaviour, but 
to open up the space for new forms of aesthetic creation. 
This figure, the “form-of-life,” which I am suggesting also describes the person 
engaged in an “aesthetics of existence,” gives rise to a very specific kind of conceptual 
configuration. By bringing the two terms of an opposition to a point of their total coinci-
dence, such that one cannot be separated from the other, Foucault and Agamben effec-
tively neutralise the distinction between the two concepts. In the figure of the ethical 
subject we have been considering, the major oppositions and distinctions which usually 
govern our thinking about ethics no longer seem to function. One can no longer distin-
guish between the being of the subject and its activity, since the subject is only its activi-
ty and its activity, what it actually does, exhausts what it is. One can no longer distin-
guish between subject and substance, because the subject is only the substantial work of 
art it fashions its life into, and this substance exhausts what it is for this subject to be. 
One can perhaps no longer even distinguish between “is” and “ought,” because the sub-
ject is only what it makes of the empty “ought” that is its freedom, and this “ought” 
does not demand anything specific of the subject (recall Foucault’s critique of Sartre – 
freedom is not freedom to realise the “true” authentic substance of your being, but free-
dom to engage in the completely open concept of “creative activity”). Instead of oppos-
ing the two sides of the binary, or even of showing how they are always unstable, con-
stantly contaminating and passing over into each other (the preferred tactic of decon-
struction), their strategy is to examine that strange zone within which the two terms can 
no longer be separated. 
We have seen, then, how Foucault’s ideas of the “care of the self” and “aesthetics 
of existence” imply a very different conception of subjectivity. These new concepts, as I 
have argued, involve a much more radical break with our traditional ethical categories 
than is often supposed. As is indicated by the enigmatic nature of these texts of Fou-
cault’s, this is an area which remains largely still to be thought, and I would suggest that 
Agamben’s work on the concept of form-of-life is an attempt to move in this direction. 
His analysis does go beyond what is explicitly written in Foucault’s texts, but can, I 
think, fruitfully be read as an extension of these themes initially developed by Foucault. 
These ethical figures open up an uncharted philosophical terrain in which many of our 
most basic ethical concepts break down. These texts of Foucault and Agamben begin the 
work of creating a new set of concepts which can function in this new conceptual space. 
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